Working papers
The Effects of the Legal Minimum Working Time on Workers, Firms and the Labor Market [PDF]
Revise and Resubmit at the Review of Economic Studies
Awards: EALE job market tour 2023, Restud tour 2023, W.E. Upjohn Institute dissertation award, Prix Jeune Docteur Banque de France
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of working time regulations on the allocation of workers and hours. I exploit a unique reform introducing a minimum workweek of 24 hours in France in 2014, affecting 15% of jobs. Drawing on administrative data and an event study design, I find a firm-level reduction in total hours worked, showing imperfect substitutability between workers and hours. The effects differ by gender: women working part-time were replaced by men working longer hours. Importantly, workers also reallocate between firms. To quantify the aggregate impact accounting for these effects, I build and estimate a search and matching model with firm and worker heterogeneity. Overall, the minimum workweek increased total hours worked by 1% due to positive general equilibrium effects, but concentrated hours among fewer workers as unemployment rose by 2%. Gender inequality increased because of the within-firm effects and less reallocation of women between firms.
Spillover Effects of Employment Protection (with Pierre Cahuc, Franck Malherbet and Pedro S. Martins)
[Previously titled "Employment Effects of Restricting Fixed-Term Contracts: Theory and Evidence"]
CEPR discussion paper, IZA discussion paper
Media: Vox column, Expresso, Portuguese Economy Research Report, Atlantico
Abstract: Estimates of the impact on employment protection generally rely on reduced-form methods, assuming that there are no indirect effects between firms. This paper exploits a labor law reform implemented in Portugal in 2009 which restricted the use of fixed-term contracts for large firms above a specific size threshold, to investigate and quantify spillover effects. Standard reduced-form estimates based on the hypothesis of absence of spillover towards firms for which the reform does not apply yield a negative impact on employment of about 1.5%. However, we find evidence of significant spillovers. The estimation of the macroeconomic effects of the reform with a search and matching model accounting for spillovers yields an almost negligible employment impact of the reform, more than ten times smaller than that obtained with the reduced form estimates. This result underlines that the numerous reduced-form estimates of the impact of employment protection that rely on firm size thresholds must be interpreted with caution.
Selected work in progress
Social Preferences, Hostility and Dismissals: Evidence from "Separations by Mutual Agreement" in France (with Benjamin Schoefer)
Do working time reductions share work? Evidence from the 35-hour reform in France (with Claire Montialoux, Elio Nimier-David, Alexandra Roulet and Nina Roussille)
Policy work
Evaluation of the impact of the severance scale for unfair dismissals (with Pierre Cahuc, Stéphane Carcillo, Flavien Moreau and Bérengère Patault) [Report in French]
Media: Le Monde, BFM TV, FranceInfo